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Abstract 
What attitude should we take toward a scientific theory when it competes with other 
scientific theories? This question elicited different answers from instrumentalists, 
logical positivists, constructive empiricists, scientific realists, holists, theory-ladenists, 
antidivisionists, falsificationists, and anarchists in the philosophy of science literature. I 
will summarize the diverse philosophical responses to the problem of 
underdetermination, and argue that there are different kinds of underdetermination, and 
that they should be kept apart from each other because they call for different responses. 
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1. Introduction 
The problem of underdetermination is one of the most widely discussed topics in the 
scientific realism-antirealism debate. The problem occurs, roughly, when a theory 
competes with rival theories. The rival theories make different claims about 
unobservables, but make (more or less) the same claims about observables. For example, 
von Neumann and Dirac's standard version of Copenhagen interpretation of quantum 
mechanics competes with Bohmian mechanics. Both theories make the same claims 
about macroscopic events, but different claims about microscopic events. According to 
the former, macroscopic events are determinate, microscopic events are probabilistic, 
and nothing travels faster than light. According to the latter, on the other hand, both 
macroscopic and microscopic events are determinate, but there exists something 
traveling faster than light. Now, the question arises as to which of the rival theories is 
true or the best. Different philosophical positions are available vis-à-vis the problem of 
underdetermination in general. I intend to summarize all of them in the literature and 
their shortcomings. Next, I shall classify underdetermination into different kinds, sketch 
different responses to each kind of underdetermination, and draw some philosophical 
morals from the different kinds of underdetermination. 
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2. Philosophical Reactions to Underdetermination in General 
Philosophers of different schools of thought have different reactions to the problem in 
which a scientific theory competes with its rival scientific theories. Instrumentalists' 
response is that a scientific theory is not a description about the world but an instrument 
for organizing thoughts about observables, i.e., connecting and relating observational 
data. So the theory is not capable of being true or false but capable of being useful or 
useless. Rival theories yielding the same predictions are not one and the same 
instrument but different instruments. So we are to choose one of them. We choose a 
simple theory over complex ones not because it is more likely to be true but because it 
is a more convenient instrument than the others. Now, an advantage of instrumentalism 
is that it takes less epistemic risk than scientific realism which recommends that we 
choose one of the rival theories and believe that it is true. Let me point out, however, 
that the advantage comes at a cost. Suppose that an instrumentalist puts forward a 
positive theory of his own in a social world in which every cognitive agent plays a fair 
game. His cognitive colleagues will in turn take the instrumentalist attitude toward it, 
refusing to believe that it is true. Thus, if the instrumentalist wants others to believe that 
his theory is true, he should be willing to believe that their theories are true. 
     Unlike instrumentalists, logical positivists believe that rival theories are one and 
the same theory. This surprising conclusion stems from their view of how we should 
understand the content of a scientific theory. For them, a scientific theory is a collection 
of theoretical and observational statements, and theoretical language is to be translated 
into observational language. The net result of the translation is that rival theories make 
the same claims about the world. Any rival theories making the same claims about 
observables are numerically identical with each other. Hence, there is no need to 
adjudicate among them. An epistemological worry is what ultimately motivates logical 
positivists to take the attitude that theoretical language is to be translated into 
observational language. In my view, a problem with the logical positivist attitude is that 
an initiator of a theory may have an intention that the theory be understood literally. 
Then, on what grounds can logical positivists claim that the theory is to be purged of 
theoretical language?  
     Unlike logical positivists, constructive empiricists literally interpret theories, 
asserting that theoretical language is not to be translated into observational language. 
Hence, rival theories are distinct from one another, making different claims about 
unobservable parts of the world. However, they agree with logical positivists that we 
should limit our beliefs on observables. The principle of economy enjoins us only to 
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believe that the rival theories are empirically adequate.
1
 Theoretical virtues, such as 
simplicity and explanation, are not epistemic but pragmatic. It is not the case that a 
simple theory with high explanatory power is more likely to be true than a complex 
theory with low explanatory power. Put differently, empirical equivalence entails 
epistemic equivalence, and we do not have any means to know which of the empirical 
equivalents is true. My problem with constructive empiricists' reaction to the problem of 
underdetermination is that it is not clear why we should settle for empirical adequacy as 
opposed to approximate empirical adequacy or anything less than approximate 
empirical adequacy.
2
 After all, “there is a slide here from empirical equivalence to 
empirical adequacy” (Psillos, 1997: 370). Put differently, from the mere fact that rival 
theories produce similar predictions, it does not necessarily follow that they are 
empirically adequate. In fact, they may be far less than empirically adequate. 
Like constructive empiricists, scientific realists believe that a scientific theory is 
to be literally understood. They believe, however, that we have means to know which of 
the rival theories is more likely to be true. Glymour, for example, claims that 
observations support theories discriminately. 
 
     My idea is that the body of evidence that distinct theories hold in common, the  
phenomena that both theories save, may nonetheless provide differing support for  
the two theories, more reason to believe one than the other, more confirmation of  
one than the other. Not because one theory is a priori more plausible or probable  
than the other but, roughly, because one theory is better tested than the other by  
the body of evidence in question. (Glymour, 1980: 342) 
 
Laudan and Leplin also contend that the same observational evidence may yield 
different degrees of inductive support for different theories.  
 
…the relative degree of evidential support for theories is not fixed by their  
empirical equivalence. (Laudan and Leplin, 1991: 460) 
 
That is, a theory can be better confirmed than its rival theories, although it is empirically 
equivalent to them. Thus, for scientific realists, empirical equivalence does not entail 
epistemic equivalence. 
     Holists would argue that it is self-defeating that empirical equivalence entails 
                                                          
1
 A theory is empirically adequate if and only if what it says about observables is true. 
2
 I propose that a theory is approximately empirically adequate just in case most of its observational 
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epistemic equivalence. A theory characteristically issues in observational consequences 
only in conjunction with auxiliary theories and statements of initial conditions as 
Duhem (1905/1954) pointed out. The auxiliary theories should be assumed to be true for 
the main theory to compete with its rival theories. But it is illegitimate to assume that 
the auxiliary theories are true if empirical equivalence entails epistemic equivalence 
because they themselves are competing with their empirically equivalent rival theories. 
If there is no basis for preferring the auxiliary theories to their rival theories, they 
cannot be assumed to be true. Leplin puts the above point as follows: 
 
What has not been recognized is that the truth of UD would prevent the  
determination that theories are empirically equivalent in the first place. (Leplin,  
1997: 154-155) 
 
It appears that the Quine-Duhem's thesis, according to which it is not a single theory but 
a group of theories that confront observations, can be utilized to combat the problem of 
underdetermination. I must point out, however, that Leplin's strategy works only for 
cases in which auxiliary theories are required to derive observational consequences 
from a main theory. In some cases, a main theory needs only statements of initial 
conditions to yield observational consequences. Poincare's example to be explained 
below fits this kind of underdetermination. 
     Theory-ladenists, in line with Gestalt psychology, could argue that the 
presupposition of the problem of underdetermination – competing theories are 
empirically equivalent – is false. The grounds for this provocative claim are that 
observation is theory-laden. Hence, scientists holding different theories in their minds 
have different observational beliefs. Since rival theories are not empirically equivalent, 
the question as to which of the empirically equivalent rival theories is true cannot even 
be raised. Thus, theory-ladenness undercuts one of the major weapons, the problem of 
underdetermination, scientific antirealists wield against scientific realism. In my view, 
however, scientific realists cannot invoke theory-ladenness to combat the problem of 
underdetermination. If there is no common observational ground between rival theories, 
it is not clear what the rational basis is for preferring one theory over other theories. 
Thus, theory-ladenness undermines not only the problem of underdetermination but also 
scientific realism. Now, in order to refute theory-laddenists’ claim, we only need to 
point to a historical fact that Kepler borrowed observational data from Tycho (Kuhn, 
1957: 206). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
consequences are true. 
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Brahe’s skillful observations were even more important than his system in leading  
his contemporaries toward a new cosmology. They provided the essential basis  
for the work of Kepler, who converted Copernicus’ innovation into the first really  
adequate solution of the problem of the planets. (Kuhn, 1957: 206) 
 
The above example shows that the theory-ladenists are wrong to say that scientists of 
rival paradigms didn’t share observational data in the history of science. 
     Antidivisionists would argue that the problem of underdetermination is saddled 
with the problematic distinction between observables and unobservables. In fact, 
Maxwell (1962: 9) argues that there is no principled distinction between observables 
and unobservables. We can see objects through windowpanes, glasses, telescopes, light 
microscopes and electron microscopes. It is clear that objects we see through 
windowpanes are observable. It is also clear that objects we see through electron 
microscopes are unobservable. But it is not clear where we should draw the line 
between observables and unobservables. Hence, it is not clear exactly what theories are 
underdetermined. Van Fraassen, however, would reply that since there are clear cases of 
underdetermination, the predicate 'underdetermination' is viable. After all, he says that 
“A vague predicate is usable provided it has clear cases and clear counter-cases” (1980: 
16). Moreover, scientific realists cannot utilize Maxwell's move to solve the problem of 
underdetermination, for his argument from the continuum above also undercuts the 
realist view that true predictions confirm a scientific theory. Prediction statements are 
also on a continuum from observational to theoretical. Some of them are clearly 
theoretical. Consider the following example (Hung, 1997: 92): The nucleus of an atom 
may emit an electron known as a beta particle when it disintegrates. From this claim in 
conjunction with the principle of conservation of mass-energy, it deductively follows 
that the mass-energy of the original nucleus is equal to that of the remnant and the beta 
particle. This deductive consequence is obviously theoretical. Hence, further steps of 
deduction are required to arrive at observational consequences. In a nutshell, scientific 
realism and antirealism are in the same boat vis-à-vis the problem of the fuzzy 
distinction between observables and unobservables. 
     For falsificationists, we can never know which of rival theories is true. Humean 
skepticism about induction drives them to hold the view that true observational 
consequences are not capable of justifying a scientific theory, although false 
observational consequences are capable of falsifying it. Thus, empirical tests are not a 
method to discover a true theory but only a method to eliminate false theories. Since we 
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cannot discover a true theory in the first place, we do not have a problem of deciding 
which of the rival theories is true. What we need to do when a theory competes with 
rival theories, according to the falsificationists, is to seek further observational 
consequences that would falsify all of them. Now, one of the well-known problems with 
falsificationism is that true observational consequences do not deductively prove that a 
scientific theory is false. As Duhem (1905/1954) notes, what confronts observations is 
not a single theory but a group of theories. So a conflict between the observations and 
the group of theories does not necessarily falsify a theory that is under a test. It might be 
other theories in the group that we should throw away as being false. Another serious 
flaw with falsificationism is that it is not clear how we could reconcile falsificationism 
with our practice of using a scientific theory to make future predictions, as Salmon 
points out: 
 
In particular, positive instances do not provide confirmation or inductive support  
for any such unrefuted generalization. At this stage, I claim, we have no basis for  
rational prediction. (Salmon, 1981: 435) 
 
If the problem of induction forbids true observational consequences from lending 
inductive support to a scientific theory, then impressive past performance of the theory 
in making true predictions should not be taken either to constitute an epistemic basis for 
believing that future predictions are true. Then, why do we use a scientific theory to 
make future predictions?  
     Anarchists would argue that when we are faced with an underdetermination we 
should not try to decide which of rival theories is true or false. Rather, we should come 
up with more alternative theories. In fact, Feyerabend claims that it is good to have 
many alternative theories.  
 
     You can be a good empiricist only if you are prepared to work with many  
alternative theories rather than with a single point of view and ‘experience.’  
(Feyerabend, 1963: 923) 
 
The justification for this view is that the invention of alternative theories leads to the 
discovery of new empirical facts and to a much sharper criticism of an accepted theory 
than does the mere comparison with observations. The point of criticizing the accepted 
theory is not to ascertain whether it is true or false but to avoid turning it into a dogma. 
In my view, however, this method for avoiding dogma comes at a price. If scientists had 
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merely criticized an accepted theory by multiplying alternative theories, and if they had 
not adjudicated between them in the history of science, false theories, such as Ptolemaic 
theory and the caloric theory, would still compete with the Copernican theory and the 
kinetic theory today. Then, it is not clear that we can claim to have gained knowledge 
about unobservables. Multiplying rival theories seems to be beneficial on the realist 
point of view only when scientific research in an area is at its early stage of 
development. If the research becomes mature enough in that area, we might as well try 
to decide which of the rival theories is true. Otherwise, we will only flounder in 
permanent controversies over the nature of the unobservable parts of the world without 
gaining any knowledge about it. But scientific antirealists, since they are not interested 
in gaining theoretical knowledge at all, would welcome Feyerabend's recommendation 
that we invent rival theories without trying to decide which of them is true or false. 
Multiplying rival theories is good as long as it enhances our empirical knowledge. 
     So far I have summarized various philosophical reactions to the problem of 
underdetermination in general that are scattered around in the literature. In sketching the 
reactions, however, I did not rigorously formulate the problem of underdetermination. 
Underdetermination, it will be shown in the next section, can be classified into different 
kinds, depending on what the nature of rival theories is. The different kinds of 
underdetermination, I will argue, give rise to different problems, calling for different 
answers.  
 
3. Different Kinds of Underdetermination and Reactions to Them 
3.1. Permanent Underdetermination vs. Transient Underdetermination  
A theory is permanently underdetermined just in case it is one of empirically equivalent 
rival theories. The empirical equivalence implies that even advanced future evidence 
may not break the tie between the rival theories. Poincare (1902/1952) provides a useful 
example to illustrate this kind of underdetermination. Imagine a world of a finite sphere 
whose space is Euclidean. Let R be its radius, and r the distance of any point from the 
center. The temperature of the sphere varies in accordance with the formula: R
2
-r
2
. As a 
result, rigid rods expand as they move toward the center of the sphere, and shrink as 
they move toward the circumference of the sphere. Light travels on circular paths in this 
world. The refractive index of the light medium is given by the formula: 1/(R
2
-r
2
). Now, 
the world described so far by the Euclidean framework can also be described by the 
non-Euclidean framework. The non-Euclidean story holds that rigid rods stay the same 
size when moved around, light travels in straight lines, the world is infinite, and the 
space is Lobachevskian. The Euclidean theory and the non-Euclidean theory can equally 
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cope with all the present and future observational data the denizens of the world could 
come up with. So the theories are under permanent underdetermination.  
     The idea of permanent underdetermination is saddled with a problematic 
assumption that the distinction between observables and unobservables is rigid. Laudan 
and Leplin point out that with technological advances we will have more accurate and 
extensive data that will break the tie between the rival theories.  
 
This result already shows that findings of empirical equivalence are not reliably  
projectable, since we cannot reliably anticipate which of a theory’s now  
unobservable consequences may become observable. (Laudan and Lepline, 1991:  
453) 
 
Maxwell further points out that our descendents, as a result of genetic mutations that 
might occur in the future, may be able to observe what we cannot observe now.  
 
Suppose that a human mutant is born who is able to “observe” ultraviolet  
radiation, or even X rays, in the same way we “observe” visible light. (Maxwell,  
1962: 11) 
 
Let me add that evolution has been enhancing the capabilities of our sensory organs. We 
can now observe things a single-celled organism could not observe billions of years ago. 
So it is “likely” that our descendents will be able to observe what we cannot observe 
now.  
     Permanent underdetermination contrasts with what Sklar (1975: 380) calls 
transient underdetermination. A theory is transiently underdetermined if and only if it is 
one of the rival theories which make different claims about unobservables but are 
compatible with all the evidence available at a point of time in the development of 
science. Note that future evidence may break the tie between the rival theories in such 
underdetermination. In this sense, the Copernican theory was under transient 
underdetermination, when it competed with the Ptolemaic theory. The two theories were 
not empirically equivalent. They made slightly different claims about observables. For 
instance, the Copernican theory predicted the phase of Venus but the Ptolemaic theory 
did not. But the scientific community back then did not have a telescope to observe the 
phase of Venus. I must point out that transient underdetermination poses no less threat 
to scientific realism than permanent underdetermination at the point of time when all the 
available evidence is compatible with rival theories. After all, at such a point of time we 
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have no choice but to appeal to such theoretical virtues as simplicity and explanatory 
power in order to determine which of the rivals is the best. But these virtues are exactly 
the ones we have to appeal to when theories are permanently underdetermined.  
 
3.2. Moderate Underdetermination vs. Radical Underdetermination  
A theory is moderately underdetermined just in case it is one of rival theories that make 
slightly different claims about unobservables. Suppose that Newton's theory of motion 
is exactly true, and that it consists of the three laws of motion, the law of gravity, and 
the hypothesis that the center of the gravity of the solar system is at rest with respect to 
absolute space. A rival theory, having the three laws of motion and the law of gravity as 
its components, claims that the center of gravity moves, say, 10 km/h with respect to 
absolute space. We can generate infinitely many rival theories by varying the absolute 
velocity of the center of the gravity. The rival theories are all observationally equivalent 
but incompatible with each other. Now, suppose that scientists were not confident of the 
absolute velocity of the center of the gravity of the solar system. Then, the rival theories, 
I contend, are all approximately true
3
 because they share the important assumptions: 
the three laws of motion and the law of gravity. The philosophical significance of 
moderate underdetermination is that it is not a serious threat to scientific realism once 
scientific realists settle for approximate truth as opposed to approximate truth.  
     Moderate underdetermination contrasts with what I call radical 
underdetermination. A theory is radically underdetermined when it is one of the rival 
theories that make radically different claims about unobservables. The claims are so 
radically different from each other that even if one of the theories is true, the rest of 
them are not even approximately true. What can scientific realists say about this kind of 
underdetermination? Suppose that we have two groups of rival theories from two 
neighboring domains. One group of rival theories, making radically different claims 
about unobservables, competes with each other in Domain 1. The other group of rival 
theories, also making radically different claims about unobservables, competes with 
each other in Domain 2. But miraculously T1 in Domain 1 coheres with T1’ in Domain 
2, i.e., they hang together in such a way that an inference from T1 to T1’ and vice versa 
is to some degree truth-preserving. What would explain the coherence of the two 
theories? Do they cohere with each other because they are (approximately) empirically 
adequate or because they are (approximately) true? The (approximate) empirical 
adequacy is not robust enough to make the two theories cohere with each other. After all, 
what the theories say about observables is only tenuously connected with what they say 
                                                          
3
 Defining ‘approximate truth’ is such a huge issue that I set it aside here. 
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about unobservables if they are radically underdetermined. Only the (approximate) truth 
has the force to make the two theories cohere with each other. Here is an analogy to 
illuminate this abstract point. We cannot hold together two lizards which do not get 
along with each other by tying their tails together. They will just run away by cutting 
their tails off from their main bodies. The only way to hold them together is to tie their 
main bodies together. In actual science, some theories of different domains do cohere 
with each other. The theory of evolution coheres with the theory of DNA and with the 
theory of plate tectonics. So it is false that such theories are under radical 
underdetermination. 
 
3.3. Actual Underdetermination vs. Possible Underdetermination 
A theory is actually underdetermined if and only if it competes with rival theories we 
conceived of. In this sense, von Neumann and Dirac's standard version of Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum mechanics is under actual underdetermination, for it competes 
with Bohemian mechanics which we conceived of. Concerning the actual 
underdetermination, Psillos contends that it is only a local phenomenon, not a global 
phenomenon, in science. 
 
More generally, the existence of empirically equivalent theories can create a  
genuine problem only if it is shown to be a global phenomenon. This is what UTE  
should demonstrate if it is to ditch any hope of discovering the blueprint of the  
universe. But, there is no relevant evidence for this. (Psillos, 1999: 168) 
 
The presence of some rival theories in a particular domain does not support the 
sweeping generalization that there are rival theories in all domains. Specifically, from 
the fact that there are some rival theories to physical theories it does not follow that 
there are serious rival theories to nonphysical theories, such as biological theories and 
geological theories. I must add that nonphysical theories are neutral as to which of the 
rival physical theories is true. The molecular structure of water, for instance, is neutral 
as to whether space is Euclidean or non-Euclidean. So even if we take an antirealist 
attitude toward the geometrical structure of the universe, it does not follow that we 
should also take the same attitude toward, say, DNA. 
     Actual underdetermination is in contrast with what I call possible 
underdetermination. A theory is possibly underdetermined if and only if it competes 
with rival theories we have not yet conceived of. In this sense, all current scientific 
theories are under possible underdetermination. Now, what follows from possible 
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underdetermination? Van Fraassen argues that in order to believe that a theory is likely 
to be true, we must first prove that truth is likely to lie in the range of the conceived 
theories rather than in the range of unconceived theories.  
 
So our selection may well be the best of a bad lot... For me to take it that the best  
of set X will be more likely to be true than not, requires a prior belief that the  
truth is already more likely to be found in X, than not. (van Fraassen,  
1989: 143) 
 
My reply to this claim is that a normative statement does not follow from a mere 
possibility statement. It is possible, for instance, that I am not a human being but a pig 
dreaming that I am a human being. Does it follow that I should run away from a butcher 
upon seeing him on the street? In my view, a normative statement follows from a 
statement with significant probability. If there is significant probability, for instance, 
that a huge meteorite will fall in New York tomorrow, then New Yorkers should 
evacuate the area. Likewise, scientific realists have the burden van Fraassen thinks they 
do only when there is a significant probability that truth is in the range of unconceived 
theories. But what is the reason for thinking that there is such a probability? 
 
3.4. Regular Underdetermination vs. Bizarre Underdetermination  
A theory is under regular underdetermination when it competes with regular scientific 
theories. All the scientific theories that competed with each other in the history of 
science were under regular underdetermination. This kind of underdetermination 
contrasts with bizarre underdetermination. A theory is under bizarre underdetermination 
if and only if it competes with bizarre theories. The bizarre theories are generated by the 
following algorithms: 
 
     For any theory T, construct the theory T1 which asserts that the empirical  
     consequences of T are true, but that none of its theoretical entities exist. (Kukla,  
     2001: 21-22)  
 
     Given theory T, construct T2 which asserts that T holds when somebody is  
     observing something, but that when there's no observation going on, the universe  
     follows the laws of some other theory T'. (ibid: 23)  
 
Kukla claims that scientists do not bother to give arguments against these theories, and 
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that scientists take bizarre underdetermination as giving rise to a philosophical problem, 
not a scientific problem.  
     Kukla's response to the problem of bizarre underdetermination is to argue that the 
bizarre theories have the prior probability of zero. Hence, it is rational for scientists to 
disregard them. A problem with the response is that it is not clear why bizarre theories, 
not regular theories, have such a probability. My alternative answer to the problem is 
that the algorithms have the potential to foster Cartesian skepticism. What is the reason 
for thinking that the algorithms have the potential to produce Cartesian skepticism? Just 
replace 'theory' with 'perceptual belief' in the above algorithms. The net results are as 
follows: 
 
     For any perceptual belief B, construct the perceptual belief B1 which asserts that  
     we have all the relevant perceptions, but the external world does not exist. 
 
     Given perceptual belief B, construct B2 which asserts that B holds when  
     somebody is making an observation, but that when there's no observation going  
     on, the universe conforms to other perceptual belief B'. 
 
Note that these two algorithms generate skepticism about perceptual beliefs. Now, what 
is wrong with Cartesian skepticism? As Maxwell (1998) points out, we cannot make 
sense of scientific enterprise in terms of Cartesian skepticism. If Maxwell is right, it is 
rational for scientists to disregard the algorithmically generated theories. 
 
4. Conclusion 
I have surveyed major philosophical positions on the topic of underdeterminiation in the 
literature. Inevitably, my own views have protruded here and there. In closing, I wish to 
draw a conclusion from the classification I made of underdetermination. The different 
kinds of underdetermination should not be conflated for a couple of reasons. First, 
scientific realism is vulnerable to some kinds of underdetermination: permanent 
underdetermination, transient underdetermination, radical underdetermination, actual 
underdetermination, and regular underdetermination. But it is not so susceptible to other 
kinds of underdetermination: moderate underdetermination, possible 
underdetermination, and bizarre underdetermination. 
     Second, a reaction that is appropriate to one kind of underdetermination may not 
be appropriate to another kind. Suppose that T1 competes with T2, and that they make 
only slightly different claims about unobservables. That is, they are under moderate 
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underdetermination. Suppose also that scientific realists believe that T1 is 
approximately true, and that scientific antirealists believe that it is empirically adequate. 
Then, it would be inappropriate for the scientific antirealists to claim that their position 
is epistemically safer than that of the scientific realists. After all, it is not clear that 
approximate truth is harder to come by than empirical adequacy when a theory is under 
moderate underdetermination.  
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